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subjects-of-a-life have inherent value.
His
concept of inherent value grows out of his
opposition to utilitarianism.
Utilitarian
rroral theory, he says, treats individuals as
"mere receptacles" for rrorally significant
value, in that harm to one individual may be
justified by the production of a greater net
benefit to other individuals.
In opposition
to this, he holds that subjects-of-a-life
have a value independent of both the value
they may place upon their lives or experiences and the value others may place upon them.

I will argue that Regan's case for the
strong animal rights position is unpersuasive
and that this position entails consequences
which a reasonable person cannot accept.
I
do not deny that some non-htman animals have
rroral rights; indeed, I would extend the
scope of the rights claim to include all
sentient animals, that is, all those capable
of having experiences, including experiences
of pleasure or satisfaction and pain, suffering, or frustration. [3] However, I do not
think that the moral rights of most non-htunan
animals are identical in strength to those of
persons. [4]
The rights of rrost non-htunan
animals may be overridden in circumstances
which would not justify overriding the rights
of persons. There are, for instance, compelling realities which sometimes require that
we kill animals for reasons which could not
justify the killing of persons.
I will call
this view "the weak animal rights" position,
even though it ascribes rights to a wider
range of animals than does the strong animal
rights position.

Inherent value, Regan argues, does not
come in degrees. To hold that some individuals have more inherent value than others is
to adopt a "perfectionist" theory, i.e., one
which assigns different moral worth to individuals according to how well they
are
thought to exemplify sane virtue(s), such as
intelligence or moral autonomy.
Perfectionist theories have been used, at least since
the time of Aristotle, to rationalize such
injustices as slavery and male domination, as
well as the unrestrained exploitation of
animals.
Regan argues that if we reject
these injustices, then we must also reject
perfectionism and conclude that all subjectsof-a-life have equal inherent value.
Moral
agents have no rrore inherent value than moral
patients, i.e., subjects-of-a-life who are
not rrorally responsible for their actions.

I will begin by summar~z~ng Regan's case
for the strong animal rights position and
noting two problems with it.
Next, I will
explore some consequences of the strong animal rights position which I think are unacceptable.
Finally, I will outline the case
for the weak animal rights position.

In the third phase of the argument,
Regan uses the thesis of equal inherent value
to derive strong moral rights for all subjects-of-a-life.
This thesis underlies the
Respect Principle, which forbids us to treat
beings who have inherent value as mere recep-,
tacles, i.e., mere means to the production of
the greatest overall good.
This principle,
in turn, underlies the Harm Principle, which
says that we have a direct prima facie duty
not to harm beings who have inherent value.
Together, these principles give rise to moral
rights.
Rights are defined as valid claims,
claims to certain goods and against certain
beings, i.e., rroral agents.
Moral rights
generate duties not only to refrain from
inflicting hann upon beings with inherent
value but also to came to their aid when they
are threatened by other moral agents. Rights
are not absolute but may be overridden in
certain circumstances.
Just what these circumstances are we will consider later.
But
first, let's look at some difficulties in the
theory as thus far presented.

Regan's Case
Regan's argument moves through three
stages. First, he argues that normal, mature
marmnals are not only sentient but have other
mental capacities, as well.
These include
the capacities for eIOOtion, memory, belief,
desire, the use of general concepts, intentional action, a sense of the future, and
some degree of self-awareness.
Creatures
with such capacities are said to be subjectsof-a-life.
They are not only alive in the
biological sense but have a psychological
identity over time and an existence which can
go better or worse for them.
Thus, they can
be harmed or benefitted. These are plausible
claims,
and well defended.
One of the
strongest parts of the book is the re1:llttal
of philosofbers, such as R. G. Frey, who
object to the application of such mentalistic
terms to creatures that do not use a htunanstyle language.[S]
The second and third
stages of the argument are more problematic.
In the second stage,
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able and having moral rights.
Intuitively,
it seems that value is one thing, and rights
are another.
It does not seem incoherent to
say that sane things (e.g., mountains, rivers, redwood trees) are inherently valuable
and yet are not the sorts of things which can
have moral rights. Nor does it seem incoherent to ascribe inherent value to sane things
which are not individuals, e.g., plant or
animal species, though it may well be incoherent to ascribe moral rights-- to
such
things.

The Mystery of Inherent Value
Inherent value is a key concept in Regan's theory.
It is the bridge between the
plausible claim that all nonnal, mature mammals--human or otherwise--are subjects-of-alife and the more debatable claim that they
all have basic moral rights of the same
strength.
But it is a highly obscure concept, and its obscurity makes it ill-suited
to play this crucial role.

In short, the concept of inherent value
seems to create at least as many problems as
it solves.
If inherent value is based on
sane natural property, then why not try to
identify that property and explain its moral
significance, without appealing to inherent
value? And if it is not based on any natural
property, then why should we believe in it?
That it may enable us to avoid sane of the
problems faced by the utilitarian is not a
sufficient reason, if it creates other problems which are just as serious.

Inherent value is defined almost entirely in negative tenns.
It is not dependent
upon the value which either the inherently
valuable individual or anyone else may place
upon that individual's life or experiences.
It is not (necessarily) a function of sentience or any other mental capacity, because,
Regan says, some entities which are not sentient (e.g., trees, rivers, or rocks) may,
nevertheless, have inherent value (p. 246).
It cannot attach to anything other than an
individual; species, eco-systems, and the
like cannot have inherent value.

Is There a Sharp Line?

These are sane of the things which inherent value is not. But what is it? Unfor-

Perhaps the most serious problems are
those that arise when we try to apply the
strong animal rights position to animals
other than nonnal, mature marmnals.
Regan's
theory requires us to divide all living
things into two categories: those which have
. the same inherent value and the same basic
rroral rights that we do, and those which have
no inherent value and presumably no rroral
rights.
But wherever we try to draw the
line, such a sharp division is implausible.

tunately, we are not told.
Inherent value
appears as a mysterious non-natural property
which we must take on faith. Regan says that
it is a postulate that subjects-of-a-life
have inherent value, a postulate justified by
the fact that it avoids certain absurdities
which he thinks follow fran a purely utilitarian theory (p. 247). But why is the postulate that subjects-of-a-life have inherent
value?
If the inherent value of a being is
canpletely independent of the value that it
or anyone else places upon its experiences,
then why does the fact that i t has certain
sorts of experiences constitute evidence that
it has inherent value? If the reason is that
subjects-of-a-life have an existence which
can go better or worse for them, then why
isn't the appropriate conclusion that all
sentient beings have inherent value, since
they would all seem to meet that condition?
Sentient but mentally unsoIilisticated beings
may have a less extensive range of possible
satisfactions and frustrations,
but
why
should it follow that they have--or may have
-no inherent value at all?

It would surely be arbitrary. to draw
such a sharp line between normal, mature
marrmals and all other living things.
Sane
birds .(e. g ., crows, magpies, parrots, mynahs)
appear to be just as mentally sopusticated
as most mammals and thus are equally strong
candidates for inclusion under the subjectof-a-life criterion.
Regan is not in fact
advocating that we draw the line here.
His
claim is only that normal, mature mammals are
clear cases, while other cases are less
clear.
Yet, on his theory, there must be
such a sharp line somewhere, since there are
no degrees of inherent value. But why should
we believe that there is a sharp line between
creatures that are subjects-of-a-life and
creatures that are not? Isn't it more likely
that "subjecthood" comes in degrees, that

In the absence of a positive account of
inherent value, it is also difficult to grasp
the connection between being inherently valu-

165

BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES

quate theory of animal rights would need to
deal.
The subject-of-a-life criterion can
provide us with little or no moral guidance
in our interactions with the vast majority of
animals.
That might be acceptable if it
could be supplemented with addilional principles which would provide such guidance. However, the radical dualism of the theory precludes supplementing it in this way.
We are
forced to say that either a spider has the
same right to life as you and I do, or it has
no right to life whatever-and that only the
gods know which of these alternatives is
true.

sane creatures have only a little self-awareness, and only a little capacity to anticipate the future, while sane have a little
rrore, and some a go::xl deal more?
Should we, for instance, regard fish,
amphibians, and reptiles as subjects-of-alife? A simple yes-or-no answer seems inadequate. On the one hand, sane of their behavior is difficult to explain without the assumption that they have sensations, beliefs,
desires, emotions, and memories; on the other
hand, they do not seem to exhibit very much
self-awareness or very much conscious anticipation of future events. Do they have enough
mental sophistication to count as subjectsof-a-life? Exactly how much is enough?

Regan I S suggestion for dealing with such
unclear cases is to apply the "benefit of the
doubt" principle. That is, when dealing with
beings that mayor may not not be subjects-

It is still more unclear what we should
say about insects, spiders, octopi, and other
invertebrate animals which have brains and
sensory organs but whose minds (if they have
minds) are even more alien to us than those
of fish or reptiles.
Such creatures are
probably sentient.
some people doubt that
they can feel pain, since they lack certain
neurological structures which are crucial to
the processing of pain impJ.1ses in vertebrate
animals.
But this argument is inconclusive,
since their nervous systems might process
pain in ways different fran ours.
When injured, they sanetimes act as if they are in
pain.
On evolutionary grounds,
it seems
unlikely that highly mobile creatures with
complex sensory systems would not have developed a capacity for pain (and pleasure),
since such a capacity has obvious survival
value. It must, however, be admitted that we
do not know whether spiders can feel pain (or
something very like it), let alone whether
they have emotions, memories, beliefs, desires, self-awareness, or a sense of the
future.

of-a-life, we should act as if they are. [6]
But i f we try to apply this principle to the
entire range of doubtful cases, we will find
ourselves with !!Oral obligations which we
cannot possibly fulfill.
In many climates,
it is virtually impossible to live without
swatting mosquitoes and exterminating cockroaches, and not all of us can afford to hire
saneone to sweep the path before we walk, in
order to make sure that we do not step on
ants.
Thus, we are still faced with the
daunting task of drawing a sharp line sanewhere on the continuum of life forms--this
time, a line demarcating the limits of the
benefit of the doubt principle.
The weak. animal rights theory provides a
more plausible way of dealing with this range
of cases, in that it allows the rights of
animals
of different kinds to vary
in
strength.
A creature I s probable degree of
mental sophistication may be relevant to the
strength of its moral rights, because mentally sophisticated creatures are apt to be
capable of greater suffering and probably
lose more which is of potential value to them
when they lose their lives. [7] The degree of
uncertainty about whether a creature is sentient at all is also relevant:
whether and
in what way we ought to apply the benefit of
the doubt principle depends in part upon how
(For instance, it is
much doubt there is.
possible that plants are sentient, but it is
so unlikely that we are surely not morally
obligated to act as though they are.)
Thus,
we may follow CClllUlOn sense in saying that to
kill a spider just for fun is not as objectionable as to kill a bird or a mamnal just
for fun, but it is wrong, nevertheless. No
sentient being should be killed except for

Even more mysterious are the mental
capacities (if any) of mobile microfauna.
The brisk and efficient way that paramecia
move about in their incessant search for fo::xl
might indicate sane kind of sentience, in
spite of their lack of eyes, ears, brains,
and other organs associated with sentience in
!!Ore complex organisms.
It is conceivable-though not very probable--that they, too, are
subjects-of-a-life.
The existence of a few unclear cases
need not pose a serious problem for a !!Oral
theory, but in this case, the unclear cases
constitute !!Ost of those with which an adeBElWEEN THE
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same good reason,
not good reasons.

and sport or aIlUlSement are

represent a threat of such magnitude as would
also justify killing people, were they to
threaten us in the same ways.
But I do not
think that this line of argument can be sustained.

Ki II ing Rodents
Now let's look at the implications of
the strong animal rights position for our
treatment of marrmals.
I agree with many of
the conclusions which Regan draws, e.g., that
the oonditions under which animals are kept
in same factory farms are deplorable and that
there is no excuse for most of the painful
experiments performed on animals in the name
of science. [8]
However, I doubt that we
oould--or should--live with a prohibition
against killing non-human mamnals as
as that which he advocates.

Regan
of-a-life
overridden
are:
(1)
punishment

holds that the right of a subjectnot to be hanned may justly be
in four types of cases.
These
self-defense by the innocent, (2)
of the guilty, (3) cases in which

innocent individuals are used as "shields" to
protect those engaged in wrongful activities,
and (4) cases in which innocent individuals
pose a threat to other innocent individuals.
Conditions (2) and (3) obviously do not apply
in the present case.
Killing mice is not a
case of self-defense against a ~ attacker, because mice are rroral patients and cannot be held responsible for the threat they
pose.
Perhaps, though, they may justly be
killed as innocent threats.
One has a right
to defend oneself even against rroral patients, who cannot be blamed for the threat
they pose.

strong

Consider, for instance, the killing of
mice and rats in order to protect food supplies and prevent the spread of disease.
Most towns and cities would become uninhabitable (by humans) if rodents were not trapped,
poisoned, or killed by cats or other small
predators kept for that purpose. It is sanetimes feasible to live-trap rodents and release them unhanned, but this method has
drawbacks. If one lives in a city, there may
be no nearby place where they can be released
without causing a problem for saneone else.
As I have discovered, live-trapping can be
rrore inhumane than the use of lethal traps,
because if two or more animals are caught in
the same trap, they may tear each other apart. Yet, on the strong animal rights position, it would be wrong to use lethal traps.
This strikes me as an unacceptable oonclusion.

The problem with this argument is that
we would not and should not oondone killing
people--especially innocent ones--in order to
protect health or property.
In the unlikely
event that human children were to invade our
houses, eating our food, making holes in the
walls, and spreading diseases, we would not
be justified in killing them. How, then, can
we be justified in killing mice under the
same circumstances, if all manrnals have the
same basic moral rights?
Arguments about the morality of killing
mice may strike the reader as trivial.
If
so, remember that it is the strong animal
rights claim which forces us to !Ake them
seriously.
If that claim is true, then to
set a lethal rrouse trap is to ccmnit the
rroral equivalent of hanicide.

One response to this objection might be
that killing mice and rats is acceptable
because rrost of the animals that are killed
are probably under a year of age (since such
creatures tend to have short lifespans). But
this would be a weak response, not only because sane are over a year of age but, rrore
to the point, because such animals tend to
reach rhysical and mental maturity at well
under that age.
It might also be suggested
that mice and rats are not subjects-of-alife.
However, I know of no reason to believe that they are any less mentally sorhisticated than rrost other marrrnals.

Ecologically Motivated Killing
The strong animal rights position is
also incompatible with our right--indeed,
perhaps our obligation--to protect the natural world fram unnecessary harm due to human
intervention.
Sane critics have argued that
it would even require us to inflict further
harm, by seeking, wherever possible, to eliminate natural predation in order to protect
prey animals. Such a project would be eoologically destructive in the extreme.
I think
that there is sane force in this objection to

A rrore serious response would be that we
are justified in killing rodents because they
threaten our well-being.
To be oonsistent
with the strong animal rights position, it
would be necessary to claim that rodents
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of smaller and more numerous ohes, such as
rabbits.
It seems, then, that we have no
option but to let the rabbits multiply I.Ultil

the strong animal rights position. [9]
However, I will not discuss it here, because it
has been extensively dealt with by other
writers, such as J. Baird callicott, [10] Mark
sagoff, [11] Alistair Gunn, [12::': Dale Jamiesan,[13] and Steve Sapontzis.[14] Instead, I
will focus on cases in which it is impossible
to protect animal pop..11ations, species, or
habitats without killing some animals.
In
making this argument, I do not wish to imply
that killing animals is the most important
way of protecting species or habitats.
But
there are sane cases in which it is necessary, if ecological disaster is to be avoided.

the last blade of grass is gone.
On the weak animal rights position, we
need not accept this oonclusion.
This approach permits us to argue that our obligation is not only to protect individual animal
lives but, more importantly, to protect the
environments in which animals can lead lives
natural to their kind. A life without predation is not natural for prey species, and it
is no favor to them to provide them such a
life if the result is greater suffering for
them and permanent damage to the resources on
which they depend.
In the long run, we
should try to reintroduce natural predators
wherever possible. In the short run, hl.Ulting
is essential in sane areas.
(Because we
cannot trust the amateur hl.Ulter to kill
cleanly and to kill only animals of species
which are overpop..11ous, it is best to employ
professional hl.Ulters when possible.)

One such class of cases is those in
which
pop..11ations of herbivores must be
culled-Le., sane of the, animals killed--in
order to alleviate overpop..11ation.
In the
absence of sufficient natural predation, some
species (e.g., deer and rabbits) can become
too numerous, and their overcropping can
permanently damage the land by making it
vulnerable to erosion or causing the local
extinction of plant or animal species. Moreover, many animals may die of starvation or
disease if their numbers are not reduced.
This is a cornm:>n defense of hl.Ulting, and I
think it is sometimes a valid one.
Granted,
it is usually because of prior human intervention that there are now too few natural
predators, but I do not think that this eliminates· our obligation to prevent further
environmental damage or unnecessary animal
suffering; if anything, it increases it. I t
would be better for the health of the prey
species to bring back the natural predators,
who do a better job of eliminating sick or
abnonnal animals than human hl.Ulters usually
do.
But this is often impossible, at least
in the short run.

Another set of cases which tell against
the strong animal rights theory are those in
which native animal or plant populations are
threatened by introduced animals.
To cite
just one example, throughout Australia feral
cats and introduced foxes are decimating many
species of small marsupials and birds.
Natural predation does not harm prey species;
it is a symbiotic relationship in which both
species normally thrive.
But predation by
introduced species is another matter.
The
small birds and marsupials of Australia have
evolved in the absence of any natural predators similar to cats or foxes and are without
defense against these extremely efficient
predators.
Canpetition fran introduced predators has contributed to the decline of the
less efficient native predators, such as the
marsupial cats, tuans, andkoweris.
Some
species are already extinct, in part as a
result of this unnatural predation. Agricultural practices, such as the too-frequent
burning of scrub and clearing of woodlands
for grazing, have alsa been detrimental to
many native species. A great deal of habitat
has been lost, perhaps permanently. But most
oonservationists believe that sane extinctions can be prevented by killing introduced
predators whenever possible.

The strong animal right.s position prohibits culling animal pop..11ations for either
environmental or humane reasons.
Regan regards the killing of individual animals for
environmental reasons as a form of fascism
(p. 362). He would permit hl.Ulting to prevent
animal starvation only if we could be certain
that all of the deaths due to hl.Ulting would
be less miserable than those caused by starvation, and we cannot be sure of this, since
it is more or less inevitable that sane animals will be wounded and left to die slowly
(p. 354). P0p..11ation control through contraception or sterilization of animals would
presUffi3.bly be permissible and might be possible with sane of the larger herbivores, but
it would probably be impossible in the case
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On the strong animal rights position,
killing introduced predators in order to save
native species fran extinction is wrong.
It
would
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surely

be wrong to kill

human

irrmi-

longed to any human being.
Fifty thousand
years of occupation. by aboriginal people did
little to reduce the richness of its flora
and fauna and may even have enhanced it. [15]
But European settlers, in two hundred years,
have eradicated dozens of species and plShed
many others to the edge of extinction.
This
is, arguably, an injustice, and I think it
would be a further injustice not to try save
those species which remain.
The weak animal
rights position permits us to do this.

grants in order to protect native fauna, and
(on Regan' s theory) this case is not significa..'1tly different.
Regan says that the fact
that an animal is a member of an endangered
species does not confer any additional rooral
rights upon it (p. 359) •
This may be true,
and it may also be true that the fact that an
animal is an introduced predator does not
~ any of its rooral rights.
But in situations of this kind, the rights of individual animals are only one of a number of
roorally relevant considerations.

Why Are Animal Rights Weaker
Than Human Rights?

Explaining the rooral basis for the obligation to prevent the extinction of plant or
animal species is an enonrous task, and one
which I cannot undertake here.
It is difficult not because there are no good reasons to
object to extinctions but because there are
so many, none of them individually overwhelming.
Species often have instrumental (e. g.,
economic, scientific, recreational) value,
but that is not the only reason for protecting them.
It seems to me that if there is
anything which has inherent value, then plant
and animal species are am::mg the things which
have such value. I regard the beauty, charm,
uniqueness, and irreplaceability of the Australian birds and small marsupials as reasons
for regarding them as inherently valuable.
It would be misleading to construe such reasons for valuing species as merely instrumental, because these are reasons for valuing
them for what they are and not just for sane
use we may hope to make of them.
I want
there to be orange-bellied parrots, noisy
scrub birds, honey possums, bush-tailed bettongs, bandicoots, hare wallabies, rat kangaroos, wanbats, wuhl wuhls, Olwbats, marsupial
cats, sugar gliders, and quokkas in the Australian bush, even though it is highly unlikely that any of them will ever be instrumentally valuable to me or mine.

How can we justify regarding the rights
of persons as generally stronger than those
of sentient beings which are not persons?
There are a plethora of bad. justifications.,
based on religious premises or false or unprovable claims about the differences between
human and non-human nature. But there is one
difference which has a clear rooral relevance:
people are at least sanetimes capable of
being IlOved to action or inaction by the
force of reasoned argument.
Rationality
rests upon other mental capacities, notably
those which Regan cites as criteria for being
a subject-of-a-life.
We share these capacities with many other animals.
But it is not
just because we are subjects-of-a-life that
we are both able and roorally ccrnpelled to
reoognize one another as beings with equal
basic IlOral rights.
It is also because we
are able to "listen to reason" in order to
settle our conflicts and cooperate in shared
projects.
This capacity, unlike the others,
may require sanething like a human language.

Why is rationality roorally relevant? It
does not make us "better" than other animals
or IlOre "perfect." It does not even automatically make us IOOre intelligent.
(Bad reasoning reduces our effective intelligence
rather than increasing it.) But it is roorally relevant insofar as it provides greater
possibilities for cooperation and for the
nonviolent resolution of problems.
It also
makes us IlOre dangerous than non-rational
beings can ever be.
Because we are potentially roore dangerous and less predictable
than wolves, we need an articulated system of
roorality to regulate our conduct.
Any human
roorality, to be workable in the long run,
must recognize the equal rroral status of all
persons, whether through the postulate of
equal basic rooral rights or in sane other
way.
The reoognition of the IlOral equality
of other persons is the price we must each

There is also a question of justice-or
sanething analogous to justice-here.
Justice is not just a matter of how we treat
individuals.
Genocide is an injustice over
and above injustices to human individuals.
When a human tribe or culture perishes, it is
not just individuals who may die but an irreplaceable form of life which has been created
over many generations.
This is part of what
makes genocide a crime against humanity, not
just a crime against individuals.
The destruction of an animal species is wrong in
sanething like the way that genocide is
wrong.
Australia belonged to its native
fauna for millions of years before it be-
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we don't regard them as quite as rational as
we are, since it is perfectly clear that rrost
people can reason well enough to determine
how to act so as to respect the basic rights
of others (if they choose to), and that is
enough for rroral equality.

pay for their re<XJgIlition of our moral equality.
Without this mutual re<XJgIlition of
rroral equality, human society can exist only
in a state of chronic and bitter conflict.
The war between the sexes will persist so
long as there is sexism and male domination;
racial conflict will never be eliminated so
long as there are racist laws and practices.
But, to the extent that we achieve a mutual
re<XJgIlition of equality, we can hope to live
together, perhaps as peacefully as welves,
achieving (in part) through explicit rroral
principles what they do not seem to need
explicit moral principles to achieve.

But what about people who are clearly
not rational?
It is often argued that soJ;histicated mental capacities such as rationality cannot be essential for the possession
of equal basic moral rights, since nearly
everyone agrees that human infants and mentally incompetent persons have such rights,
even though they may lack those soJ;histicated
mental capacities.
But this argument is
inoonclusive,
because there are p:JWerful
practical and errotional reasons for protecting non-rational human beings, reasons which
are absent in the case of rrost non-human
animals. Infancy and mental incampetence are
human conditions which all of us either have
experienced or are likely to experience at
scme time.
W3· also protect babies and mentally incampetent people because we care for
them.
We don't normally care for animals in
the same way, and when we do-e.g., in the
case of much-loved pets--we may regard them
as having special rights by virtue of their
relationship to us. We protect them not only
for their sake but also for our own, lest we
be hurt by harm done to them.
Regan holds
that such "side-effects" are irrelevant to
rroral rights, and perhaps they are.
But in
ordinary usage, there is no sharp line between rroral rights and those moral protections which are not rights. The extension of
strong rroral protections to infants and the
mentally impaired in no way proves that nonhuman animals have the same basic rroral
rights as people.

Why not extend this re<XJgIlition of moral
equality to other creatures, even though they
cannot do the same for us?
The answer is
that we cannot.
Because we cannot reason
with most non-human animals, we cannot ahlays
solve the problems which they may cause without harming them--although we are always
obligated to try.
We cannot negotiate a
treaty with the feral cats and foxes, requiring them to stop preying on endangered native
species in return for suitable concessions on
our part.
If rats invade our houses. •• we
cannot reason with them, hoping to
persuade them of the injustice they
do us.
We can only attempt to get
rid of them. [16 ]
Aristotle was not wrong in claiming that
the C9-pacity to alter one's behavior on the
basis of reasoned argument is relevant to the
full rroral status which he accorded to free
men.
Of course, he was wrong in his other
premise, that wanen and slaves by their nature cannot reason well enough to function as
autonorrous rroral agents.
Had that premise
been true, so would his conclusion that warren
and slaves are not quite the moral equals of
free men.
In the case of rrost non-human
animals, the corresPonding premise is true.

Why Speak of "Animal Rights" at All?
If, as I have argued, reality precludes
our treating all animals as our moral equals,
then why should we still ascribe rights to
. them? Everyone agrees that animals are entitled to scme protection against human abuse,
but why speak of animal rights i f we are not
prepared to accept most animals as our moral
equals?
The weak animal rights position may.
seem an unstable ccmpranise between the bold
claim that animals have the same basic moral
rights that we do and the more camm::m view
that animals have no rights at all.

If, on the other hand, there are animals with
whcm we can (learn to) reason, then we are
obligated to do this and to regard them as
our moral equals.
Thus, to distinguish between the rights
of persons and those of most other animals on
the grounds that only people can alter their
behavior on the basis of reasoned argument
does not canmit us to a perfectionist theory
of the sort Aristotle endorsed.
There is no
excuse for refusing to recognize the moral
equality of sane people on the grounds that
BEIWEEN THE SPEX::IE.S

It

prove

170

or

is probably iIllfXJssible to either
disprove the thesis that animals

have m::>ral rights by producing an analysis of
the concept of a m::>ral right and checking to
see if sane or all animals satisfy the conditions for having rights.
The concept of a
moral right is canplex, and it is not clear
which of its strands are essential. Paradigm
rights holders, i.e., mature and mentally
oompetent persons, are both rational and
morally autonOllDus beings and sentient subjects-of-a-life.
Opponents of animal rights
claim that rationality and m::>ral autoncmy are
essential for the possession of rights, while
defenders of anirral rights claim that they
are not.
The ordinary concept of a m::>ral
right is probably not precise enough to enable us to determine who is right on purely
definitional grounds.

is also inadequate in that it does not preclude the killing of animals-for any reason,
however trivial--so long as it is done relatively painlessly.
The inadequacy of the anti-cruelty view
provides one practical reason for speaking of
animal rights.
Another practical reason is
that this is an age in which nearly all
significant m::>ral claims tend to be expressed
in terms of rights.
Thus, the denial that
ani.rnals have rights, however carefully qualified, is likely to be taken to mean that we
may do whatever we like to them, provided
that we do not violate any human rights.
In
such a oontext, speaking of the rights of
anirrals may be the only way to persuade many
people to take seriously protests against the
abuse of animals.

If logical analysis will not answer the
question
of whether animals have
m::>ral
rights, practical considerations may, nevertheless, incline us to say that they do. Th,e
IJDst plausible alternative to the view that
anirrals have IJDral rights is that, while they
do not have rights, we are, nevertheless,
obligated not to be cruel to them.
Regan
argues persuasively that the injunction to
avoid being cruel to animals is inadequate to
express
our obligations towards animals,
because it focuses on the mental states of
those who cause anirral suffering, rather than
on the harm done to the animals themselves
(p. 158) •
Cruelty is inflicting pain or
suffering and either taking pleasure in that
pain or suffering or being m::>re or less indifferent to it. Thus, to express the demand
for the decent treatment of anirrals in terms
of the rejection of cruelty is to invite th,e

Why not extend this line of argument and
speak of the rights of trees, m::>untains,
oceans, or anything else which we may wish to
see protected fran destruction?
Sane environmentalists have not hesitated to speak in
this way, and, given the importance of protecting such elements of the natural world,
they cannot be blamed for using this rhetorical device.
But, I would argue that IJDral
rights can meaningfully be ascribed only to
entities ·which have sane capacity for sentience.
This is because m::>ral rights are
protections designed to protect rights holders from hanns or to provide them with benefits which matter to them.
Only beings capable of sentience can be harmed or benefitted
in ways which matter to them, for only such
beings can like or dislike what happens to
them or prefer sane oonditions to others.
Thus, sentient animals, unlike m::>untains,
rivers, or species, are at least logically
possible candidates for moral rights.
This
fact, together with the need to end current
abuses of anirrals-e.g., in scientific research
and intensive farming-provides a
plausible case for speaking of animal rights.

Conclusion
I have argued that Regan •s case for
ascribing strong moral rights to all normal,
mature rnarmlals is unpersuasive because (1) it
rests upon the obs=e concept of inherent
value, wJrich is defined only in negative
terms, and (2) it seems to preclude any plausible answer to questions about the m::>ral
status of the vast majority of sentient animals. Moreover, (3) the strong anirral rights
position leads to unacceptable oonclusions:

Jim Harter, Animals: 141q
Cooyriorht-Free-IrIUsi;r;t'I':m5.
Ne'... Jork: Dover, "\979

too easy response that those who subject
animals to suffering are not being cruel
because they regret the suffering they cause
but sincerely believe that what they do is
justified.
The injunction to avoid cruelty
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2. For instance, Peter Singer, although
he does not like to speak of rights, includes
all sentient beings under the protection of
his basic utilitarian principle of equal
respect for like interests.
(Animal Liberation (New York: Avon Books, 1975), p. 3.)

e.g., that we may not kill rodents when they
invade our houses or protect endangered species by killing introduced predators. The
weak aninal rights position allows for the
necessary flexibility in dealing with animals
when they pose a threat to our well-being, or
that of other animals, or ecological systems.
On the other hand, it also ascribes IOOral
rights to a much wider range of animals: not
just normal, mature mamnals but all sentient
beings, whether warm- or cold-blooded, vertebrate or invertebrate.

3. The capacity for sentience, like all
of the mental capacities mentioned in what
follows, is a disposition.
Dispositions do
not disappear whenever they are not currently
manifested.
Thus, sleeping or temporarily
unconscious persons or non-hum:m aninals are
still sentient in the relevant sense (i.e.,
still capable of sentience), so long as they
still have the neurological mechanisms necessary for the occurrence of experiences.

The weak animal rights theory asserts
that (1) any creature whose natural IOOde of
life includes the pursuit of certain satisfactions has the right not to be forced to
exist without the opportunity to pursue those
satisfactions; (2) that any creature which is
capable of pain, suffering, or frustration
has the right that such experiences not be
deliberately inflicted upon it without sane
compelling reason; and (3) that no sentient
being should be killed without good reason.
HOW'ever, IOOral rights are not an all-ornothing affair.
The strength of the reasons
required to override the rights of a nonhum:m organism varies, depending upon-a.-oc>ng
other things--the probability that it is
sentient and (if it is clearly sentient) its
probable degree of mental sophistication. In
the words of A. M. MacIver,

4. It is possible, perhaps probable
that sane non-hum:m aninals--such as cetaceans and anthropoid apes--should be regarded
as persons.
If so, then the weak animal
rights position holds that these animals have
the same basic IOOral rights as hum:m persons.
5. See
R. G. Frey,
Interests and
Rights:
The Case Against Animals (OXford:
OXford University Press, 1980).

6. See, for instance, p. 319, where
Regan appeals to the benefit of the doubt
principle when dealing with infanticide and
late-term abortion.

If I tread wantonly on a woodlouse,
I do wrong. • • • But it is only a
very small wrong, and to exaggerate
its
wrongness is
sentimentality. [17]

7. Regan appears to admit the relevance
of such considerations when he says that in
the lifeboat case we should throw the dog
overboard rather than one of the hum:m passengers, because death would be a lesser harm
to the dog (p. 351) •
HOW'ever, he does not
think it follows that the dog's right to life
is weaker than ours.

8. Whether it is wrong to kill animals
for food, when other foods are available, is
a much IOOre difficult question and one which
I cannot consider at length here.
In brief,
I do not think that we wrong aninals by
raising them for food, provided that their
lives and deaths are no worse than they probably would have been had they lived in the
"wild. .. As we all know, contemporary methods
of aninal husbandry often fail to meet this
condition.
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